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INTRODUCTION
Water is crucial for life on earth to exist.' Without water, life
cannot exist.2 There is an ongoing debate in the international commu-
nity whether the right to water is a fundamental human right.3 When
considering the right to water, what is really at issue is access to clean
drinking water. Several countries throughout the world have incorpo-
rated a fundamental right to access to clean drinking water in their
constitutions, particularly in the developing world.4 However, there is
a problem enforcing this right when over two billion people, even with
this right enshrined in their constitutions, still lack access to clean
drinking water.5
The solution that arose in the 1980s and 1990s was to privatize
public utilities, with the idea that it takes private money to finance the
expansion of access to water to those that are too poor or lack local
1. Peter Tyson, Life's Little Essential, PBS NOVA, (Jan. 4, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/nova/evolutionlliquid-of-life.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Shashank Upadhye, The International Watercourse: An Exploitable Resource for
the Developing Nation Under International Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 61, 63
(2000).
4. SVITLANA KRAvcHENKo & JOHN BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
CASES, LAW, AND POLICY 129-131 (2008) (discussing South Africa's Constitution recognizing
a right to sufficient water; although the right is not stated explicitly, the Indian courts have
interpreted the right to life to include the right to clean and sufficient water; Argentina has
an explicit right to water in its Constitution).
5. Morgan McDonald, Assessing the New Wave: Transaction Costs of Water Law
Reform in Latin America, 17 Sw. J. INT'L L. 175, 191 (2011).
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infrastructure.6 To this end, multilateral development banks, such as
the World Bank, began requiring impoverished nations who had out-
standing loans from the World Bank to privatize their public water
utilities and their access to water to secure or maintain those nations'
current outstanding loans.7
However, when private companies take control of public utili-
ties or a nation's entire access to water, they may attempt to raise
prices on current access to water in order to obtain short-term profits.8
In countries such as Bolivia, these actions resulted in disruption of the
water supply and civil unrest.9 Some countries, and in rare cases pri-
vate companies, have completely abandoned the water privatization
initiatives.10 The problem of the impoverished public utilities' inability
to provide access to the poor is a serious problem worldwide. Even
when there is an explicit fundamental right to water in a developing
country's constitution, that nation's government loses all legitimacy
when that nation's public utilities find themselves unable to provide
access to water to all its citizens." This shortcoming, coupled with the
private companies' inability to do the same, is a serious global problem.
The solution to this challenge is a private-public partnership.
This paper will address the existing laws internationally and in
Bolivia that address the right to water. Part I will address the evolu-
tion and current status of the recognition of a human's right to water.
It will describe the growing trend of various nations' recognition of a
fundamental right to water in their constitutions and also will address
the global trend of privatization of water. Part II will discuss the World
Bank and its involvement with Bolivia's privatization of its water sup-
plies. Part III will address Bolivia's and its struggle with water rights,
including the privatization of Cochabamba, Bolivia's third largest city,
the civil unrest leading to the "water wars" of 2000, the outcome of the
water wars, and the precarious situation Bolivia now faces with re-
spect to access to water.
6. Amy K. Miller, Blue Rush: Is an International Privatization Agreement a Viable
Solution for Developing Countries in the Face of an Impending World Water Crisis?, 16 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 228 (2005).
7. Adam D. Link, The Perils of Privatization: International Developments and Reform
in Water Distribution, 22 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 379, 381 (2010).
8. John Nellis, Privatization in Latin America, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT,
WORKING PAPER 31, (2003) available at http://www.cgdev.org/files/2759_file-cgd wpO3l.pdf
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
9. William Finnegan, Letter From Bolivia: Leasing the Rain, THE NEW YORKER (Apr.
8, 2002), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/04/08/020408faFACT1 (last
visited Feb 24, 2012).
10. Id.
11. Link, supra note 7, at 381.
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Part IV proposes possible solutions to the problem of both the
private and public inability to provide meaningful access to water for
the peoples of Bolivia. The solution will begin by looking at the success
of the United States' Rural Electrification Administration and its pos-
sible application through micro-loans provided by the World Bank to
the people of Bolivia. This solution could work within Bolivia's current
legal framework, to utilize both public and private entities to provide
access to water for the poor and rural peoples of Bolivia. The proposed
solution will provide a possible solution to make the human right to
water an enforceable and legitimate human right not just in Bolivia,
but also possibly throughout the developing world.
I. Is THERE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO WATER?
A. History of Fundamental Right to Water
1. Treaties
The United Nations' principal judicial organ is the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), which plays an important part in
identifying and developing international law.12 Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute identifies the five sources of international law: international
conventions, international customary law, general principles of law, ju-
dicial decisions and scholarly writings. 13 The main sources of
international laws, also known as "hard law," are international con-
ventions, commonly known as treaties; international customary law;
and general principles. Judicial decisions and scholarly writings are
considered persuasive, and are known as "soft law." To determine
whether an idea such as the right to water is a fundamental human
right, one must look to hard law.
At the international level, states have not reached a consensus
to recognize water as a human right; however, several international
human rights treaties indirectly protect the right to water.14 The Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
indirectly provides for the human right to water under Article 11(1),
which addresses the right to adequate standard of living and Article
12. DAVID HUNTER ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 285 (4th
ed. 2011).
13. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No
993, 3 Bevans 1179, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&
p2=2&p3=0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
14. G.A. Res 217A (III) U.N.Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). The Universal Declaration was
adopted as a UN General Assembly Resolution.
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12(1), governing the right to health.15 In addition, the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) Article 14(2)(h) provides "women the right: to enjoy adequate
living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, elec-
tricity and water supply."16 Similarly, Article 24 of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC) states, "Parties shall take appropriate
measure" to "combat disease and malnutrition, including within the
framework of primary health care, though, inter alia. . .provision of
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water."17 Finally, the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in Article 28,
provides for an adequate standard of living and social protection in
that States parties "must ensure equal access by persons with disabili-
ties to clean water services, and ensure access to appropriate and
affordable services, devices and other assistance for disability-related
needs.18
The Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of
War provides that "sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to pris-
oners of war," and that "the Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of
war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water,
and with the necessary clothing and medical attention."' 9 Article 46
provides that "the Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war dur-
ing transfer with sufficient food and drinking water to keep them in
good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and medical
attention."20
15. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
16. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
G.A. Res 34/180, Art. 14(2)(h), U.N. Doc A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).
17. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, Art. 24(2)(c), U.N. Doc A/44/
49 (Sept. 2, 1990).
18. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, Art. 28,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec.13, 2006).
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War P 26, Art. 20,
Aug. 13, 1949, 6 U.S.T.S. 135, available at http:/www2.ohchr.orglenglish/law/prisonerwar.
htm.
20. Id. at Art. 46. Comparable provisions can be found in the Fourth Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, the Additional Protocol I
on Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, and Additional Protocol II on
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict. See, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protocol of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 85, 89, 172, Aug. 12, 1949,
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?Open
Document.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Art. 46, 54-55, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument.
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None of these treaties casts the entitlement to water as a
human right; instead, they place a duty on governments to ensure that
water, among other things necessary to life and good health, is pro-
vided to members of insular member groups that have been identified
as requiring special protection. 2 1
3. Declarations
In 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights adopted general comment 15 on the right to
water.22 The general comment explains that the right to water is con-
sidered implicit in Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR covering the right
to an adequate standard of living, and the right to health respec-
tively.23 In 2006, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights adopted the guidelines for the realization of the right
to drinking water and sanitation.24
In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution, which "[recognizes] the right to safe and clean drinking
water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full
enjoyment of life and all human rights."25 Subsequently, the Human
Rights Council, in September 2010, affirmed this recognition and clari-
fied that the right is derived from the right to an adequate standard of
living.26 The Human Rights Council, in March 2011, extended the
mandate on water and sanitation, and changed its title to the Special
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation.27
21. KRAVCHENKO & BONINE, supra note 4, at 118.
22. U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ESCOSOCI, Comm'n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultrual Rights), P 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
23. Id.
24. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, Realization of
the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation, U.N. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights,§ 6.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25 (July 11, 2005) (By El Hadji Guisse), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Water/SUbComGuisseguidelines.pdf.
25. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/
292 (Aug. 3, 2010) available at http://www.un.org/galsearch/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/
64/292.
26. Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, H.R.C. Res.15/9,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9 (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G10/166/33/PDF/G1016633.pdf?OpenElement.
27. The Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, U.N. H.R.C. Res. 16/2,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/2 8 (Apr. 2011), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/124/85/PDF/G1112485.pdfOpenElement.
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B. Constitutional Rights to Water
There are explicitly declared fundamental rights to water in
constitutions throughout the world.2 8 On October 31, 2004, the people
of Uruguay made history by becoming the first people in the world to
vote and approve, by an almost two-thirds majority, an amendment to
their constitution which enshrines a human right to water.2 9 The right
not only explicitly states that access to safe water is a fundamental
human right, but also states that there should be policies that create
priorities to make sure everyone has access to drinking water and that
social policies should be paramount to "economic considerations."3 0
Bolivia's recently drafted constitution explicitly states that its
citizens have a constitutional right to water,3 1 and it is the responsibil-
ity of the Bolivian government to provide access to water to all of its
citizens. 32 Thus, there is no universal answer as to whether there is a
fundamental human right to access to water. The answer largely de-
pends on an individual's location.
C. Trend of Commercialization of Water
1. What is privatized water?
The word "privatization" may imply water supplies free of gov-
ernment oversight or participation and completely in the hands of
private individuals; however, this is rarely the case.33 Water privatiza-
tion is simply "the transfer of ownership of water supply systems to
private companies." 34 But it is much more complex in that privatiza-
tion may refer to a variety of different partnerships between
governments and private companies with "varying degrees of govern-
mental control and oversight of water resources and infrastructure."35
In fact, very few governments allow the water itself to go completely
28. KRAVCHENKO & BONINE, supra note 4, at 129.
29. Blue Planet Project, Water is a Human Right, available at http://www.blueplanet
project.net/documents/RTW-handbill.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
30. Uruguay Const. art. 47.
31. Const. Bolivia Ch. II, Art 16(1).
32. Const. Bolivia Ch. II, Art. 20(2).
33. Miller, supra note 6, at 228.
34. Karren Bakker, Commons Versus Commodities, Debating the Human Right to
Water, in THE RIGHT TO WATER, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL STRUGGLES 25 (Farhana
Sulana & Alex Loftus eds., 2012).
35. Miller, supra note 6, at 228.
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into private ownership or permit completely unsupervised engagement
of the private sector.36
There are four different forms of water privatization.37 First
and perhaps the simplest form of privatization are joint arrangements
or mixed managements. 38 In a mixed management arrangement, gov-
ernments outsource specific tasks, such as operation and maintenance
contracts, to private firms.39 The government still retains all owner-
ship of the physical assets, such as the pipes and wells, but its level of
oversight will vary according to the specific arrangement. 40 Private
firms are often able to provide both managerial and operational exper-
tise to greatly improve efficiency. 41 These arrangements offer much-
needed flexibility for the government because they can vary in scope
and duration and often include performance-based incentives and pen-
alties that are not available in the public sector.42
The second and most common form of privatization of the water
supplies is concessions.43 Full concession arrangements transfer opera-
tional and management responsibility for entire water systems,
including financial and commercial risk, to a private contractor for a
fixed term.44 In addition to full concession contracts, there are also par-
tial concession contracts, which are defined by the specific duties
transferred to the private entity.45 In full or partial concession ar-
rangements, the government maintains control over the service
provision through monitoring and regulations, and at the conclusion of
the fixed term, the private contractor must return the assets to the
government in good condition. 46 Concessions diminish the need for
more intrusive forms of regulation while ensuring that prices do not
reach exorbitant levels. 47 As an additional advantage, the responsibil-
36. Id. at 228-229.
37. Id. at 229-232.
38. PETER H. GLEICK, ET. AL., PAC. INST. FOR STUDIES IN DEV., ENV'T & SECURITY, The
New Economy of Water: The Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh
Water, 27 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/new economy-of water/
new economy-of water.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
39. Miller, supra note 6, at 229.
40. Id.
41. Jamie Knotts, Privatization - When Public Goes Private, ON TAP MAG. (2003),
available at http://www.nesc.wvu.edulndwc/articles/OT/SP03/Privatization.html (last vis-
ited on Feb. 25, 2012).
42. Id.
43. Miller, supra note 6, at 230.
44. GLEICK, ET. AL., supra note 38, at 27-28.
45. Miller, supra note 6, at 230.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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ity for operations, maintenance, and investments remain with a single
contractor.48 However, success can be difficult to achieve because both
full and partial concessions require clearly defined responsibilities,
risks, and a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 49
The third form of privatization is the split ownership model, in
which private and public shareholders split ownership of water sys-
tems in a corporate utility.50 Such organizations generally have a
corporate structure managed by a board of directors. 51 Usually the
public sector retains the majority of the ownership usually due to local
legal restrictions on private ownership. 52 This model of privatization is
beneficial because it reconciles two potentially conflicting goals of
water supply, the public's goals of affordability, water quality, equity of
access, and expansion of service which offset the private owners' goals
to maximize profits and recuperate costs.5 3
The fourth form of privatization, divestitures, is the most ex-
treme and least used option.5" Under this approach, a government sells
ownership and operations of the water system to a private company.55
Common forms of divestiture can include selling shares of the utility,
selling physical assets, opening a government-owned company to pri-
vate investment, and offering management or employee buy-outs.56
Divestitures can generate substantial improvements in efficiency and
increase national income; however, regulation of water quality and
other public protections may not be available under this model, leaving
its use appropriate only in markets with significant unmet demands.57
2. Benefits and Drawbacks of Water Privatization
Nearly all technical studies of Latin American privatization of
utilities conclude that it improves performance, profits, efficiency, and
output.5 8 In addition to the potential benefits of increased efficiency
and reduced corruption, one study found that conditionality privatiza-
48. Id.
49. GLEICK, ET. AL., supra note 38, at 27-28.
50. Id. at 28
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Miller, supra note 6, at 231.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Nellis, supra note 8.
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tion has important ancillary economic benefits not commonly cited.59
The value of privatized assets in IMF debtor countries increase as mea-
sured by investor willingness to pay more for those privatized assets
because investors see adoption of pro-privatization policies as "a signal
of credible policy reform."60 This overall increased willingness to invest
by private parties creates more capital that is very beneficial to these
developing countries.61
Privatization also provides incentives for countries and their
private partners to redistribute and conserve water resources and pro-
motes efficiency in water and sanitation distribution.62 Moreover,
privatization provides a solution to many of the common problems of
developing countries in providing access to utilities, such as inade-
quate financing in the operations of public services and political
manipulation of state-owned utilities.6 3 Many critics of water utility
privatization concede that for developing countries, private capital is
required because the governments lack the financial resources to in-
vest and expand water utilities. 64 Essentially these investments are
needed because municipal water systems in developing countries lack
the funds to extend piping and connections.65
There are numerous drawbacks of water privatization. The
most obvious and widespread criticism of privatization of water is that
privatization of the water supply inevitably results in steep increases
in utility prices.66 Rate increases may make water unaffordable to the
poor, some neighborhoods and groups can lose access to water, and
profits from the system will inevitably leave the community.67 When
water is not affordable, the poor forego the expensive and safe access to
water in exchange for the less safe and cheaper alternatives.68 The
alternatives have ancillary disastrous effects, including poor sanitation
and hygiene, and the spread of water-borne illness.69 In addition, once
59. NANCY BRUNE, ET AL., The International Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of
Privatization, 51 IMF STAFF PAPERS 195, 199 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/staffp/2004/02/pdflbrune.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Miller, supra note 6, at 229.
63. Id.
64. Itzchak Kornfeld, A Global Water Apartheid: From Revelations to Resolution, 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 701, 718 (2010).
65. Id.
66. Nellis, supra note 8.
67. Link, supra note 7, at 383.
68. Finnegan, supra note 9.
69. World Health Organization [wHo], WATER-RELATED DISEASES, available at http://
www.who.int/water-sanitationhealth/diseases/en/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
360
THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION
a government privatizes its water system, withdrawing from the deal
is difficult and can subject the government to complicated interna-
tional litigation or arbitrationY"o The most notable instance in which a
private company demonstrated this downside of water privatization
was the water wars of Cochabamba, Bolivia at the turn of the century
as a result of the World Bank's involvement.7 1
II. WORLD BANK POLICY AND PROCEDURES
A. History of the World Bank
The World Bank has a history of participating in the privatiza-
tion of water in numerous developing countries around the world,
although that was not the original purpose of the World Bank. 72 The
World Bank was established in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference
in New Hampshire, which aimed to stabilize the international finan-
cial order after World War II.73 The Bank's original purpose was to
focus on rebuilding Europe; however, following the implementation of
the United States Marshall Plan, the World Bank shifted its focus from
reconstruction to project-based lending.74
The World Bank is the largest multilateral development organi-
zation in the world.75 The World Bank supports approximately $20
billion in projects and leverages an additional $50 billion from other
institutions each year.76 The Bank's influence is widespread especially
by "coordinating donors, mobilizing bilateral and increasingly private-
sector financing, conducting policy research, and providing technical
assistance to borrowing countries."77
The World Bank's involvement in the privatization of Cocha-
bamba's water systems was not an isolated event. It was a publicized
example of what the World Bank does all around the world. There cur-
rently is a high demand for World Bank engagement in water projects,
with lending for water projects accounting for about 16 percent of all
70. Id.
71. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J. L. &
HuMAN. 94, 94-95 (2006).
72. Bretton Woods Project, The World Bank and water privatization: Public money
down the drain, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, Sept. 26, 2008, available at http://www.
brettonwoodsproject.orglart-562458 (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
73. KRAVCHENKO& BONINE, supra note 4, at 445.
74. Id.
75. HUNTER ETAL, supra note 12, at 229.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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World Bank lending from 1994-2004.78 From the World Bank's point of
view, "water resources management and development are central to
sustainable growth and poverty reduction and therefore [are] of central
importance to the mission of the World Bank."79 Between 1990 and
November 2002, out of 276 loans labeled "water supply" awarded by
the World Bank, at least 84 of the projects required the debtor country
to privatize its water operations in some way before it received its
funds.80 Besides Bolivia, countries where the World Bank has a history
of privatizing water include Tanzania, Armenia, Zambia and India.8 1
In each of these countries, privatization resulted in substantially
higher water prices for consumers. 82
B. World Bank's Involvement in Bolivia's Access to Water
In the 1990s, Bolivia had privatized most of its publicly owned
utilities; however, water was one of the few remaining utilities the Bo-
livian government had not yet privatized.8 3 The World Bank took
notice and had an interest in the municipal water systems of the coun-
try's three largest cities - La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba.84
According to the World Bank's Senior Water Advisor, John Briscoe, the
systems of La Paz and Cochabamba, which were both run as public
utilities, failed to adequately meet the needs of the cities they served
and that in Cochabamba there was "no credible provider," and that
privatization had to be an option to consider. 5 At the time, the Boliv-
ian government was considering two options for increasing the supply
of water to Cochabamba: the Misicuni Multipurpose Project, which was
a giant dam building project; and the Corani Tunnel Project, which in-
volved the construction of a tunnel to transport water to the city.8 6 The
World Bank considered the proposed Minicuni Dam project not feasible
78. World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy, Strategic Directions for World Bank
Engagement, at 9, (2004), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContent
Server/WDSP/IB/2004/06/01/000090341_20040601150257/Rendered/PDF/28114.pdf.
79. Id. at 10.
80. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Promoting Privatization,
IWATCH NEWS By THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Aug. 11, 2011, available at http://
www.iwatchnews.org/2003/02/03/5708/promoting-privatization (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
81. Bretton Woods Project, supra note 72.
82. Id.
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due to its high cost and advised Bolivia not to pursue the project.87 The
Bank stated that any project involving the dam or tunnel would re-
quire private investment. 8 The Bolivian government wanted to move
forward with the dam project and sought private investors.89
The World Bank pushed for water privatization in the city, issu-
ing a report in June 1999, and even went as far as urging "no public
subsidies be given to hold down the price of water."90 According to the
World Bank, "privatization would bring market discipline and effi-
ciency, as well as much needed foreign capital to expand the SE1IAPA
network to underserved segments of the population."9 1 John Briscoe
concisely stated the World Bank's position in noting, "if you are genu-
inely concerned with [people] getting water, what is the best route to
do that?. . [We've] had decades of [public water management], and it
hasn't worked. It's a. . . simple reality that it hasn't worked." 92 The
World Bank had good intentions in its desire to privatize Bolivia's
water utilities, with the hopes of expanding access to water and sewage
treatment to the rural and poor in Bolivia. As will be described, how-
ever, that was not the result.
C. World Bank's Framework Encouraging Privatization
If there is a fundamental human right to water, how then does
the World Bank privatize a country's water supply? The World Bank
has influence in governmental action and uses conditions to providing
financial assistance.9 3 Specifically, the World Bank often requires
countries to accept "structural adjustment," which includes opening
markets to foreign companies and privatizing state enterprises, includ-
ing water systems.94 In terms of water, the World Bank's view is that it
is reluctant to "lend to a country that appears to be mismanaging its
water system - by neglecting needed investments, failing to run effi-
87. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Bolivia, Major cities Water and
Sewerage Rehabilitiation, at 68 (June 12, 1998), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.
orglexternal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/06/12/000009265_3980728143441/
Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf [hereinafter Implementation].
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ENvro. L. & POL'Y 357, 364 (2006).
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cient systems, and drowning in corruption."95 The World Bank will
often use conditional lending to finance multinational corporations in-
stead of encouraging efficient public enterprises to run developing
nations' water utilities to reduce national debt.9 6
Water rights and policy are left to the determination of each
sovereign state where "the water is distributed as the development of
water resources management policy, as with all government policy, is
the sovereign function of national states."97 The World Bank provides
assistance to struggling nations; however, the assistance, support, and
capital come with strings attached.98 One major instrument that the
World Bank has at its disposal to encourage a particular set of policy
goals is conditional lending.9 9 Conditional lending by the World Bank
is defined as a set of conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank to
make disbursements in a development policy operation.oo Sometimes
the conditioned terms are simply triggers and benchmarks, but they
can also include an element of mandatory privatization.10
The World Bank has three different categories of loan condi-
tions with corresponding degrees of leveraging power.102 The three
types of agreements in descending order of private controls are conces-
sion agreements, lease agreements, and management contracts. 103
Under a concession agreement, a private company is awarded the
rights and responsibilities for everything from setting customer price
structures and labor to decisions regarding the expansion of the infra-
structure. 104 These contracts usually have longer durations than the
other types of agreements and at termination, control over the assets
remain with the private company.105 Next, under a lease agreement,
the private company receives its revenues from customer fees and has
control over both the price structure and labor; however, these can be
shorter in duration than concession agreements, may or may not in-
95. Jennifer Naegele, What is Wrong with Full-Fledged Water Privatization, 6 J. L. &
Soc. CHALLENGES 99, 109 (2004).
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clude infrastructure development, and usually specify which assets
revert to the state at termination. 106 Finally, under a management
agreement, the private company receives a set fee for managing the
distribution system but control of all fees, rates, and assets remains
with the state.10 7
In addition to the three types of conditional lending contracts,
the World Bank also maintains policies discouraging government sub-
sidies and encouraging a plan of full cost recovery.108 For the World
Bank, "full cost recovery implies that the water consumers should
cover the cost of operating, maintaining, and expanding the water util-
ity as needed."109 The World Bank's full recovery requirements tend to
prohibit developing governments from subsidizing any part of the cost
of services, while private companies can charge customers for infra-
structure improvements that may not be made for years.x"0 "There is
some sensitivity as to whether under a privatized system full cost re-
covery includes a reasonable rate of return on investment for the
participating private company, but is seems private companies do in-
clude this reasonable profit margin in their recovery figures.""11 "As
part of its pure full cost recovery goal, the World Bank also discourages
government subsidization of the water systems." 1 1 2
III. BOLIVIA's STRUGGLE WITH WATER RIGHTS
A. History of Bolivia's Water Rights
Bolivia's history with water begins with its democratically
elected government being overthrown by an army coup d'6tat in
1964.113 What followed were years of military dictatorships, which re-
sulted in government corruption and hyper inflation.114 Since 1985,
following the return of the government to the people, the country has
been financially dependent on the World Bank. 115 The World Bank has
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Naegele, supra note 95, at 109.
111. Link, supra note 7, at 384.
112. Id.
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at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcriptl25 full.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012)
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been willing to loan money to Bolivia with conditions, such as privatiz-
ing public assets, under the assumption that where the government
had failed because of widespread corruption, the private market would
succeed. 116 The leaders of Bolivia followed the directions of the World
Bank and began to sell off national assets such as the airlines, utilities,
mines, and railroads to private companies. At the same time, they tried
to eradicate the illegal drug trade of coca leaves, which at the time
represented 3% of Bolivia's GDP and 18% of its exports.117 This transi-
tion period resulted in an increase in Bolivia's dependence on
international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank.118
1. The Nationalized Era
The need to improve water services in Bolivia was urgent, and
the government was ill-equipped to address the problem.119 The World
Bank was involved in financing three water projects in Bolivia in the
1980s and 1990S. 1 2 0 The government of Bolivia subsequently ap-
proached the World Bank seeking a more ambitious water supply and
sanitation program, which the Bank approved of in the Major Cities
Water Supply and Sewerage Rehabilitation Project, worth 35 million
U.S. dollars. 121
Prior to privatization, Bolivia had "achieved major progress in
improving access to piped water supply and sanitation between 1992
and 1997."122 "Even with these advances, the water supply reached
only seventy-two percent of Bolivians as of 1997."123 In fact, by the late
1990s, about 400,000 people in Cochabamba, Bolivia's third largest
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Amanda Norris & Katina Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private Contracts:
Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 31, 34 (2010).
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Policy Dialogue and Development Operations, at 75 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVIResources/PEPRAnnex2_WaterSectorRe
form.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
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between International Development Association and "SAUGAPAC" project number P006172,
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city, were not connected to the city's water system and most were pay-
ing exorbitant prices for water delivered by trucks. 124 Cochabamba's
water problems had worsened since the 1970s as hundreds of
thousands moved into the city from rural areas and smaller towns. 125
The water system had been overburdened and the water table beneath
the city was rapidly dropping. 126 Bolivia could not afford to provide
needed improvements in its water service. 127
Even if it could have afforded improvements, the government
water agency was "notoriously plagued with acts of corruption."128
Many of Cochabamba's neighborhoods were never hooked up to the
water system, so locals tried to take matter into their own hands in the
1990s.12 9 The residents of San Miguel, a neighborhood in Cochabamba,
fed up with the lack of access to water, dug their own well.130 The
neighborhood built it by working together, and as the residents of San
Miguel saw it, they worked as a group to build it, so it belonged to all of
them, a total of 240 families. 13' This example of lack of access to the
water system was systemic across Cochabamba, and even if parts of
the city were hooked up to the network, the water service was always
inconsistent.132 The government wanted to expand the city's water net-
work, but could not afford to do so.
In the World Bank's view, Cochabamba was a city screaming for
privatization of its water supply. 13 3 To achieve its goals of expanding
infrastructure and access to the water systems, the World Bank condi-
tioned the extension of the closing date of the 1990 loan on the
implementation of the privatization of the Cochabamba water utility,
SEMAPA.134 Consequently, Bolivia began soliciting bids in 1998 to
privatize its water and sewage services in Cochabamba. 35
124. NOW, supra note 115.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 119, at 34-5.
128. Id. at 35.
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2. Negotiation and Privatization of Bolivia's Water Rights
When the government of Bolivia put the city's water up for auc-
tion, only one bidder appeared, a company created solely for the
purpose called Aguas del Tunari. 13 6 Aguas del Tunari made the only
bid in April 1999 and it fell short of complying with the requirements
of the tender process. 137 Nonetheless, the company then entered into
concession negotiations with Bolivian representatives, who were part
of a negotiation committee formed by government decree.138 For Aguas
del Tunari, the situation presented a profitable opportunity to improve
delivery of desperately needed water to consumers in Bolivia.139 How-
ever, it appeared as if Aguas del Tunari had not given much thought to
how its plans would be received in Cochabamba. 140 The company's rep-
resentatives on the ground included "engineers, not marketers . . .
newly arrived from abroad," who were arguably "not attuned to the
problems or passions of the Bolivian public."141
Aguas del Tunari seemed surprised when some alarmed citi-
zens raised concerns about the transparency of the negotiation
process. 142 While Bolivian citizens were generally aware that the gov-
ernment was in a negotiation process to sell off its water system in
Cochabamba, they "sought more specific information concerning that
process." 143 In fact, a newspaper article dated September 3, 1999, com-
plained about the apparent secrecy of the negotiation process and
requested that the Bolivian government "publicize the true rates that
would govern before it concluded the Concession."144
Unknown to those desiring more information about the contract
negotiation, the Bolivian government had already approved the text of
the contract the day before, on September 2, 1999.145 On September 3,
1999, the same day the newspaper article argued for more trans-
parency in the ongoing negotiation process, the Concession contract
negotiations were concluded and signed by representatives of Aguas
del Tunari and the Bolivian government.146 The Concession contract,
136. NOW, supra note 116.
137. Aguas, supra note 136.
138. Id.
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signed without the public's awareness, reflected the lack of competition
for the contract by granting Aguas del Tunari a $2.5 billion, forty-year
.relationship" with the Bolivian Water and Electricity Superintenden-
cies. 147 Aguas del Tunari would take over the municipal water network
and all the smaller systems in the metropolitan area, and would have
exclusive rights to all the water in the district, even in the aquifer. 148
The contract also required Aguas del Tunari to provide a regulated
amount of water, of a certain quality, for Cochabamba in exchange for
a negotiated sixteen percent return on its investment. 149 The rate of
return "would be adjusted annually to the consumer price index in the
United States."1 5 0
Once the final contract's existence became known to the public,
reaction to the contract was immediate and unfavorable.15 1 The Boliv-
ian government later admitted that "[i]n fairness, no one negotiating
the Concession agreement could have anticipated the intensely hostile
reaction that greeted [Aguas del Tunari] immediately upon the Agree-
ment's signing."152 The outrage over the contract and the way it was
negotiated, and the anger towards Aguas del Tunari, continued to grow
in the ensuing months, especially when it was discovered that the ma-
jority shareholder in Aguas del Tunari was Bechtel, a multinational
conglomerate.153 As per the concession contract, the water concession
itself would take effect on November 1, 1999.154
B. Cochabamba's "Water Wars"
1. The Concession Takes Effect
The protests initially only sought a decrease in water rates, but
anger started to mount when it became known that not only was Aguas
del Tunari going to raise rates, but also was not going to expand ser-
vice to the impoverished southern part of the city where the company
had no profits to gain from an expensive expansion. 155 Two months af-
ter taking over the Cochabamba water system, Aguas del Tunari did
147. Finnegan, supra note 9.
148. Id.
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the inevitable and raised water rates by as much as 200 percent.156
People making eighty dollars a month were being asked to pay twenty
dollars a month just for water. 157
Prior to taking over Cochabamba, the city's water system had
been operating at a loss of more than $2.25 million a year for the past
six years, with debts in excess of $35 million. 158 Aguas del Tunari ra-
tionalized the rate increase by saying that the rates had to be
increased to where they covered at least the costs incurred in opera-
tion.159 Not only were the rates going up, but Aguas del Tunari had the
authority to start charging people for water it did not even provide,
including the water from privately dug wells like the one in San Miguel
previously mentioned.160 In fact, for cooperative wells like San Mi-
guel's community well, which the government had not helped build,
Aguas del Tunari could go in and install meters and begin charging for
the water extracted from the well, in addition to charging the residents
for the installation of the meter.161
2. The Water Wars
The ultimate response to privatization was a popular uprising
in Cochabamba, lasting from February to March 2000.162 With the
rates soaring, people in Cochabamba felt Aguas del Tunari was not
merely covering its costs; they felt as if the company was gouging
them. 163 There were street protests and a broad coalition emerged of
neighborhood associations, water cooperatives, labor unions, engi-
neers, environmentalists and peasant farmers, called the Coordinator
for the Defense of Water and Life (La Coordinadora) led by Oscar
Olivera, a machinist from a shoe factory. 164 The poor of Cochabamba
called Aguas del Tunari's actions as trying to "lease the rain."165
Thousands of people took to the city's streets to protest the
privatization of their water that included the communities' coopera-
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tively managed domestic water systems and family wells.166 Aguas del
Tunari executives in Cochabamba did not have any plans on how their
actions would be received, especially since most were foreign engi-
neers, not marketers, having literally just arrived in the country and
were not attuned to the pulse of the Bolivian people.167 In fact, the
company's manager, Geoffrey Thorpe, stated in an indifferent manner
that if the people did not pay their water bills, then their water would
be turned off. 6 8
In February 2000, the protests and the "water war" began in
earnest.169 People that were unlikely to participate in protests, let
alone become violent, did so during these protests. 170 Everyone from
housewives to street children were out protesting Aguas del Tunari,
with the crowds so outraged they began throwing stones at the po-
lice. 171 The government of Bolivia's response was to send a ministerial
delegation to Cochabamba. 172 By the end of February, although the
water price hikes had been rolled back, the protests continued. 173
Fearing the demonstrations would threaten future foreign in-
vestment in Bolivia, the government of Bolivia decided to take further
action to stop the demonstrations.174 The government sent in troops to
break up the protests and nearly 200 protesters were arrested, with
seventy civilians and fifty-one policemen wounded from the clashes. 175
By April 2000, the protesters once again occupied the Cochabamba cen-
tral plaza. 176 When La Coordinadora's leaders, including Oscar
Olivera, arrived at the Governor's office for a meeting, they were
arrested.177
This situation resulted in a nationwide protest and a declara-
tion of a national state of siege on April 8, 2000, essentially declaring a
state of martial law allowing for mass arrests and the use of force. 178
The day the state of siege was declared, the Bolivian Army fired tear
gas into the protestors in Cochabamba and cut off power to local radio
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and television stations.179 The "water war" turned deadly when an
army sharpshooter in civilian clothes fired into a crowd of unarmed
protesters killing a seventeen year old student.180 It was at this point
that it became clear that there was "no future for Aguas del Tunari in
Cochabamba."18 The company's executives were told that the police
could no longer guarantee their safety, and they fled Cochabamba and
Bolivia as soon as they could.182 The next day the government of Bo-
livia informed Aguas del Tunari that because they had "abandoned" its
concessions, the contract was revoked.' 83
3. Result of the Water Wars
President Hugo Banzer announced on April 11, 2000 that the
privatization law had been revised.18 4 Following the revocation of the
Privatization law, SEMAPA resumed providing water and sanitation
services and the contract with Aguas del Tunari was cancelled.'8 5
After the "water wars" of 2000, the Bolivian government turned
to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) instead of the
World Bank for advice on how to restructure its water resource man-
agement systems. 8 6 The International Development Research Centre
(IDRC), for example, supported a research project organized by the
Commission for Integrated Water Resource Management. 8 7 Input was
collected from irrigation councils and farmers to help determine the
most efficient approaches to water resource management.188 The Boliv-
ian government employed the project results in drafting a new
irrigation law.18 9 Because it was designed using input from the public,
it gained widespread acceptance, the importance of which should not
be underestimated, given the levels of activism concerning resource
management in Bolivia today.' 9 0
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C. Bolivia's Constitution
1. The New Constitution's Explicit Fundamental Right to Water
Evo Morales was elected largely due to the public outcry over
the failure of the privatizations of both Bolivia's water and natural gas
systems. 191 President Morales recognized and identified with the popu-
lation's concerns, and on January 3, 2007 stated "water cannot be
turned over to private business. .. [ilt must remain a basic service,
with participation of the State so that water can be provided almost for
free."19 2 The fundamental right to water has been the framing dialogue
for water politics in Bolivia since the presidential election in 2006.193
The drive for a fundamental right to water in Bolivia came from social
organizations that lobbied heavily for the creation of the Ministry for
the Environment and Water, and continued during the Constituent As-
sembly meetings of 2006-2007.194 Various social organizations in
Bolivia then presented numerous proposals and discussed what re-
sponsibilities the government of Bolivia should have around water and
its management.195 Water was prioritized for consumption and produc-
tion in these meetings.196 These discussions culminated in the addition
of the right to water in the new Bolivian constitution. The constitution
prominently declared that, "Everyone has the right to water and
food."'9
The ratified new Bolivian Constitution of 2008 not only men-
tions the water wars in its preamble, but outlines the fundamental
right to water in the following pronouncements with respect to water:
* Water is a fundamental right for life (Articles 16, 20, 373, 374)
* The protection of water sources against contamination (Articles
274, 376)
* Respect for traditional uses and customs around water (Articles
374, 375)
191. Tom Perreault, Popular Protest and Unpopular Policies: State Restructuring,
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(Farhana Sulana & Alex Loftus ed., 2012).
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* The elimination of water concessions and prohibition of the
privatization of water services (Articles 20, 373)
* Regulation and management of water resources with social par-
ticipation (Article 374)
* Protection of water sources from free trade agreements (Article
377).198
Bolivia has also outlined a plan of commitment to improve ac-
cess to water outlined in Bolivia's National Plan for Development 2006-
2010, and more explicitly in the National Plan for Basic Sanitation
2008-2015, which outlines a target to ensure that 90% of the country
has access to water by 2015.199 These policies state goals, but do not
explain how they will achieve them, especially when many Bolivians
are living with water shortages and droughts. 200
2. Bolivia's Current Precarious Position
The reality is that small community groups are still largely
managing water, such as in San Miguel, or private groups are selling
access to water in rural and poor regions of Bolivia. 201 In the rapidly
expanding southern part of Cochabamba, coincidentally the most im-
poverished part of the city, the public sector provider, SEMAPA, still
does not operate. 202 Community-led associations, water committees,
and private water vendors continue to serve the majority of the region
with limited financial resources and supplies, while communities con-
tinue to wait for the long-promised water from the Misicuni Dam
project to arrive. 203
While the Bolivian Constitution explicitly states "[ilt is the re-
sponsibility of the state, at all levels of government" to "provide access
to water and sanitation,"204 in the south of the city, the government
has yet to demonstrate sufficient capacity, nor has it sufficiently in-
vested to be able to engage, or regulate the largely independent water
providers. 205 Bolivia has created a system of licenses that has given
community-managed systems the right to use specific water sources;
however, many of the subterranean sources on which these licensees
rely are not adequate for human consumption because they are salty or
198. Id.; Bustamante, supra note 193.
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contaminated. 206 Many of the community committees that control local
water rights are fiercely independent and are not willing to let the
state take control of their water sources. 207 Instead, they are looking
for financial, technical, or organizational support to improve access to,
and ensure their people receive, quality water.208 For all of these rea-
sons, numerous local groups continue to feel abandoned by the state
and the policies that have emerged from the water wars.209
Wholly private or wholly governmental control over access to
safe water may work for some cultures and countries; however, such
complete top-down or bottom-up models will likely not be successful in
reforming a developing country, especially without considering the an-
cillary costs associated with adopting such legal reforms.2 10 While the
Bolivian government has recognized "the population's cultural values
and desire for the water to be in the public's hands, it may be at the
expense of realizing the right to water."211 Developing the infrastruc-
ture, including water pipelines, the Misicuni dam, and related projects
to fulfill the state's responsibility to provide basic amounts of safe
water to every person of Bolivia will be a very expensive endeavor.212
The Bolivian government has put itself in a precarious position
by prohibiting all private investment in water infrastructure, while at
the same time promising the population a basic level of water to fulfill
its recognition of water as a human right.213 The government has
neither ideas nor any model for how the new regime is going to provide
nearly free water.214 And even if investment were encouraged, the "ex-
perience of strong democratic social mobilization turning violent has
fostered an uninviting environment in which foreign entities are un-
willing to invest the much needed capital."215 Foreign capital is simply
required to improve the water infrastructure. 2 16 If the infrastructure
cannot be put into place to provide water to the people, then the new
constitution and the government of Bolivia risk loss of faith in both the
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security of fundamental rights and the legitimacy of the
government. 217
With the Bolivian government not following through on its con-
stitutional promise to provide basic water services, most communities
feel neglected.2 18 In Cochabamba, service from SEMAPA has not im-
proved since the new constitution has gone into effect, as coverage
rates remain below 50%, and those who receive water experience only
intermittent service with continually high prices. 219 The government's
failure is widely considered "a direct result of the constitutional prohi-
bition of private investment in water services, which has resulted in
insufficient investment necessary for improved infrastructure and low
cost distribution in Bolivia's water system."220 Consequently, even
though the Bolivian constitution now expressly provides for the human
right to water for citizens, these communities have still had to build
their own water systems with wells managed locally in a cooperative
manner. 221
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR BOLIVIA THROUGH A PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
A. The Rural Electrification Administration
1. What is the Rural Electrification Administration?
During the Great Depression, rural communities lacked elec-
tricity because for-profit electric companies believed that constructing
power lines to potential customers in rural areas was unprofitable, and
therefore, not reasonable. 222 By the 1930s, almost 90% of the urban
inhabitants had electricity, whereas only 10% of rural residents had
electricity. 223 There was a market failure in providing access to electric
power to the rural residents. 224 The private utility companies, who
supplied electric power to most of the nation's consumers, argued that
it was too expensive to string electric power lines to isolated rural
farmsteads and that nearly all farmers were too poor to afford electric-
217. Id.
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ity.225 The Roosevelt Administration considered this a major problem,
and thought that the country could do better.
In 1935, the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), one of
the many New Deal programs, was established to bring electricity to
rural areas of the United States, specifically areas like the Tennessee
Valley, where utility companies would not provide access to electricity.
The head of the REA, Morris Cooke, in 1935 stated:
In addition to paying for the energy he used, the farmer was ex-
pected to advance to the power company most or all of the costs of
construction. Since utility company ideas as to what constituted
sound rural lines have been rather fancy, such costs were prohibi-
tive for most farmers. 226
Like private water consortiums, such as Aguas del Tunari, the electric
utilities falsely believed that it would be cost prohibitive to expand ac-
cess to those who do not have access because of the short sightedness of
their profit motives. President Roosevelt's foresight that electricity
was a modern necessity mandated that if the private market would not
act, then the federal government would step in and provide loans to the
rural residents so that the utility companies would be able to construct
access to the power grid. 2 2 7 Under the REA, rural residents were
loaned money from the federal government to create cooperatives in
which they would construct electric utilities and manage them to all
members of the rural community. 228 The government gave the re-
sidents the tools to create and self manage their utility needs.
2. Success of the Rural Electrification Administration
"Even as late as July 1935, a group of utility company execu-
tives wrote a report in which they claimed that, in light of their earlier
extensive research, 'there are very few farms requiring electricity for
major farm operations that are not now served."' 229 This statement
would eventually come to haunt the for-profit electric industry when
the REA and the rural electric cooperatives, of which there are more
than 900 today, confirmed the falsity of the view that most farms re-
quiring electricity were being served.230 Rural electrification was
225. Id.
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rooted in the conviction that an affordable supply of electricity would
improve the standard of living and the economic viability of rural
communities.231
As the number of rural households with electricity increased, an
interesting phenomenon took place-the rural communities required
more energy than urban communities. 23 2 As soon as these farmers
were connected to the electric grid, they began purchasing refrigera-
tors, stoves, and countless other electrical appliances. 233 These sales
began to spur local economies by improving business and, as demand
grew for more electricity, the added need defrayed the cost of construct-
ing power lines across the countryside.2 3 4 Over the next few decades,
the number of rural cooperatives doubled and the number of consum-
ers tripled. 235 Consequently, the number of rural consumers who were
connected to and served by the rural electric system grew at an expo-
nential rate.2 3 6 By 1953, over 90% of the farms across the United
States were connected; today that number has increased to above
99%.237 In fewer than 20 years, the number of those without access to
electricity dropped 90% to 10%, largely because of the REA and its sys-
tem of loaning money to rural communities to create cooperatives.
The REA was different from nearly every other New Deal pro-
gram "in that it did not involve much federal spending beyond the
wages of its staff." Instead, it was a loan program in which REA would
extend low-interest loans and staff experts to cooperatives created by
rural people who wanted electricity. 238 And even after the disappear-
ance of the background framework of the REA, cooperatives all across
the nation are still producing electricity.239 In addition, since its incep-
tion 77 years ago, the default rate on funds loaned by the federal
government to these cooperatives has been negligible, less than one
percent. 240
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B. Micro-loans
One of the most successful methods of gathering and providing
private capital that could be used to help expand access to water in
developing countries is micro-loans. 24 1 Micro-loans are part of a system
of micro-finance which refers to the provision of a broad range of finan-
cial services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers
and insurance to poor and low-income households and their micro-en-
terprises. 242 This system of micro-lending was created by Muhammad
Yunus, a Bangladeshi economist and owner of the Grameen Bank in
the late 1970s. Yunus went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for
the wild success of his revolutionary micro-loan system.243 Micro-loans
are generally small and restricted to the amount borrowers can repay
from their savings, rather than from profits on their business invest-
ments. 24 4 Repayment is usually spread out over a period of time
ranging from several months to a year and interest rates for the loans
are often high, for example Grameen Bank charges borrowers rates of
up to 20%.245 Although such rates are higher than those charged by
traditional banks, they are often lower than other alternatives availa-
ble to the poor in the developing world, if such alternatives are
available. 246 Despite these high interest rates, micro-lending institu-
tions enjoy high repayment rates, usually above 95% rate of
repayment.247
How is it that the repayment rate is so high when these loans
are made to the desperately poor? Repayment is driven by social pres-
sure, a peer pressure-based system of lending, and that replaces a
system of collateral-based lending.248 Mr. Yunus's Grameen system
works in the following manner. When borrowers seek a loan, they are
required to establish a group of five other borrowers from their neigh-
borhood or join a group of such borrowers, and agree to meet with these
241. Id. at 726-727.
242. Aliya Khawari, Microfinance: Does It Hold Its Promises? HAMBURG INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 3 (2004), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edulbitstream/
26394/11/dp040276.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
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other borrowers on a weekly basis. 2 4 9 Members can only apply for fu-
ture loans once the group resolves its outstanding debt, and since the
group of borrowers is in on this loan together, the system encourages
social responsibility to repay.2 50 Interestingly, micro-loans have an
even higher rate of return when the borrowers also receive some form
of business education along with the initial loan. 2 5 1
C. Application of REA and Micro-loans to a Workable World Bank
Loan Program to Bolivia
The World Bank has acknowledged that privatization of water
rights in Bolivia is not the answer.2 5 2 The World Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department has stated:
Privatization is not a panacea. A pragmatic approach tailored to
local circumstances should be adopted for effective institutional de-
velopment. Privatization does not insulate a utility from the
consequences of poor project selection, political interference, weak
management or lack of community support. The Bolivia experience
demonstrates that cooperative solutions can be superior to either
public or private approaches to utility management. 253
The World Bank itself acknowledges that the concession agreement
with Bolivia to privatize its water rights to private companies is not
the answer, but that the answer is really a bottom up, public-private
cooperative model.
The solution to Bolivia's water problems might be in the form of
a direct loan to the people of Bolivia similar to that of the REA. The
World Bank could make direct loans to regional cooperatives that have
the sole purpose to create access to water for a local community. The
incentive for the World Bank to make such a risky loan would be to
borrow from the Micro-loan scheme of Grameen Bank, of using a sys-
tem of peer pressure as an alternative to collateral, while making loans
with a higher than average interest rate and setting three conditions
for receiving the loans.
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First, require the recipient of the loans to create a board of
neighbors to oversee the creation of either a well or expansion of pipes
to connect a village to other villages' water systems. This requirement
would establish a system of peer pressure on the recipient of the loan
to ensure that the loan is repaid. It would also allow for the first step
towards creation of an ultimate cooperative board, just like the REA,
that would oversee the construction of the well and subsequent infra-
structure for the particular village. The subsequent maintenance board
would ultimately serve as the cooperative water utility for that partic-
ular village once the well or pipes have been expanded.
Second, require that the village receive proper education to cre-
ate the well or expand access to a safe water system. This can be
achieved by having a corps of retired and volunteer well drillers that
can be assembled to teach members of a particular region how to drill
wells. 25 4 After the local village understands how to drill and construct
a well, the village can "pay it forward" to other villages by passing on
the knowledge of how to create wells based on the knowledge they re-
ceived when they built their own well. The incentive for the various
tribes and other indigent people to work together would be that the
initial group could not have wells drilled in its village until it taught
and helped at least one village or other group to drill wells, and have
this requirement imposed on each subsequent group.255
Third, require that this board receive a minimum level of busi-
ness education, so that they could understand how to repay the loan.
Since each village already has a governance structure, this structure
can be employed to gather the repayment funds and decide what
type(s) of businesses would best suit the village's members. 256 Once ac-
cess to water is expanded, more people will use water for a myriad of
purposes. The expansion of access should not end with the creation of a
well in a village that did not have a well, it should then continue to the
addition of faucets and running water to buildings. With higher water
consumption, impoverished areas can then begin to develop. Villages
can then branch out to provide proper sanitation and educational op-
portunities for children, as children will no longer be forced to stay
home to help retrieve water.257 The villages would then be able to pro-
vide other amenities to villagers, while reducing the spread of
waterborne illness, resulting in a situation similar to that of the rural
farmers in the REA, thus increasing the standard of living.
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CONCLUSION
Just as breathing air is necessary for life, water is necessary for
life. In a perfect world, clean water would be free just like the air; how-
ever, we do not live in a perfect world. We live in a world where water
is not free. Although the efforts worldwide to enshrine a fundamental
human right to water are admirable, such an objective would not be a
realistic option in today's global environment. If a fundamental right to
water were to be internationally declared, international law would lose
legitimacy because it would not be possible to enforce this right. This is
not to say that the globe should not pursue this as an ultimate goal one
day. However, before international law recognizes this right, the gov-
ernments of the world should make great effort to provide access to
safe and clean water, so that when the right to water is declared a
fundamental right, it will be a legitimate and enforceable right.
The World Bank is actively working towards the ultimate goal
of providing every person access to clean drinking water, but it cannot
privatize every water source in the world, throw money at it, and de-
clare the problem solved. A top-down approach does not work in every
situation. The world is much too complex to expect a one-size-fits-all
solution to fix everything. The best way to address large scale problems
is usually to look at problems in smaller components, and see if there
are smaller answers or, in this case, a local solution. Just as every na-
tion has its own cultures and history, problems around the world are
just as varied, and to attempt to use the same rigid model to address
similar problems may work in isolated cases, but will fail in isolated
cases as well. To claim that the government is best or a private com-
pany is best to provide access to water in large populations is too
limited an answer. The answer will vary based on the local people in
the local situation. And in the developing world, the solution generally
is a mix of both public and private.
Bolivia is a microcosm of this problem. Publicly owned water
utilities failed to provide water access to millions and privately owned
water utilities failed as well. In the village of San Miguel in Cocha-
bamba, when the government failed to act, the village acted on its own.
Hundreds of thousands of people in Bolivia lack access to water
today. Declaring water a fundamental right has done nothing to ex-
pand access to those who are still in need. A possible solution would be
to build off of historic successes. Just as those who do not pay attention
to history are bound to repeat the same mistakes of the past, those who
attempt to try what has worked could very well have the same success
as their predecessors. The Rural Electrification Administration
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through its loan process provided access to electricity to rural America,
which resulted in the creation of vast new economies. Applying the
REA with a combination of micro-loan practices could generate a possi-
ble solution to the problem of access to water in Bolivia and,
ultimately, elsewhere in the developing world. Total privatization
failed in Cochabamba, and total public ownership failed as well. If this
public-private partnership model succeeds, then the world can move
towards the declaration of a legitimate and enforceable human right to
water.
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